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The Reconstruction of Lisbon Following the Earthquake of 1755: a study in despotic 
planning 
 
John R. Mullin 
Department of Urban Planning, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA 
 
 This paper is a description and analysis of the plan for the rebuilding of Lisbon 
following the earthquake of 1755.  This tremor was so devastating that the entire city 
centre, the Baixa, ceased to exist.  From this chaos emerged the Marquês de Pombal who, 
with the approval of the King, immediately brought order and began to develop efforts to 
create the new Lisbon.  The effort first focused upon the development of four options that 
included rebuilding the city as it was, reconstructing the city with minimal improvements 
to the street pattern, undertaking a total rebuilding effort or starting fresh on a new site.  
After considerable analysis, Pombal selected the option to build under the ‘clean slate’ 
option.  After selection of this option, the planners created six detailed plans.  After 
considerable review, the dos Santos concept was selected.  These six plans, designed 
largely by military engineers, were created with the intent of furthering Pombal’s goal of 
creating a city that reflected new values.  The city was to reflect a society in which the 
citizen, the merchant and the bureaucrat took precedence over the crown, church and 
nobility.  The results were indeed a new Lisbon. 
 
Introduction 
 The revitalization of a city following a calamitous event represents an 
unparalleled opportunity to reshape its form in accordance with new design standards and 
cultural ideals.  At times the opportunity has been largely wasted (e.g. London’s Wren 
Plan following the Great Fire), at times it has resulted in haste and mediocrity (e.g. 
Frankfurt and Warsaw after World War II), at times it has been evolutionary (e.g. the 
reclamation of tidal lands as part of the flood prevention programme around Amsterdam) 
and at times it has amounted to the beginning of a new order.  Such was the result of the 
plan for Lisbon following the earthquake of 1755.  This earthquake was so severe that it 
is still featured in standard textbooks on geology.  Perhaps more interestingly, it is most 
known for its critical part in Voltaire’s Candide, which is still standard reading in most 
universities in Europe and the United States.  Who can ever forget Dr. Pangloss’ 
acceptance of Nature’s will in the face of such havoc?  While trained in the Vaubanesque 
school of fortification thought, the results are not reflective of this influence.  However, 
beyond science and literature, the new plan for Lisbon is of equal importance to city 
planning historians for three reasons.  First, it represents the embodiment of a carefully 
developed, top down process that rejected past values and forms in order that the city 
would reflect the most modern thought possible.  Secondly, the form of the city was 
developed to reflect new values.  Lisbon was no longer the city of the King, Cardinal 
Patriarch and the nobility.  It was to be the home of the people’s government, the 
merchant and the middle class.  Thirdly, it was largely designed by an autocratic leader 
and military engineers trained in the Vaubanesque tradition yet there is little in the plan 
that called for designs such that, as examples, troops could be garrisoned therein or that 
rapid deployment to the far points of the city could occur.  If one seeks an answer to the 
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question of where is there a militarily derived plan that is not reflective of military 
concepts, then the answer can be found in the Lisbon Plan of 1755-56. 
 This paper is a description and analysis of the development of this Plan.  It begins 
with a brief overview of the impact of the earthquake on Lisbon, discusses the conceptual 
thinking that was applied to the various options, describes the six alternative plans that 
were developed and then reviews the results. 
 
The earthquake 
 At 9:40 a.m. on 1 November, All Saints’ Day, 1755, an earthquake struck the city 
of Lisbon, Portugal, with such force that within a matter of minutes, the city’s central 
core, the Baixa, was reduced to rubble [1].  After three major aftershocks, a tidal wave 
that raised the Tagus River approximately 20 feet, raging fires, looting and pestilence, the 
core of the city was left virtually uninhabitable [2]. 
 Although no accurate death count was ever determined, of the 250,000 people 
living in Lisbon at the time, it was estimated 10-30,000 died as a result of the tremor, the 
fires and subsequent diseases [3]. 
 Virtually all of the City’s major structures suffered extensive damage [4].  Of 
Lisbon’s 40 churches, all sustained some structural damage while 35 were completely 
destroyed.  Of the 75 convents only 10 were left intact.  One of seven old-age homes 
remained inhabitable, and none of the prisons or hospitals escaped unscathed.  Nor was 
the nobility spared: 33 palaces were reduced to rubble, most of which were focal points to 
the neighborhoods in which they were situated.  The Arsenal, the River Palace, the Royal 
Library and the Patriarchal Palace were all destroyed.  Perhaps most startling, of 
approximately 20,000 housing units in the city, only 14,000 remained habitable.  While 
no exact tally of the total losses was ever made, it was estimated that approximately 10% 
of the nation’s wealth was consumed by the earthquake’s devastation [5]. 
 The greatest damage occurred in the Baixa.  Authentically reminiscent of the 
Middle Ages with its narrow streets, winding alleys and densely packed wooden housing, 
the Baixa (literally translated as ‘Lower Town’) was built on alluvial soft soils and 
Miocente fine sands and surrounded by steep hills on three sides.  This combination of 
structural, spatial and soil characteristics created a set of conditions that, once the tremor 
struck, caused the Baixa to collapse inward upon itself [6].  And with it came havoc to 
the commercial, financial, judicial, bureaucratic and royal centre of the Portuguese nation 
and empire. 
 King José I (1717-77) and his court escaped since they were in Belém, three miles 
from the centre of Lisbon, when the tremor struck [7].  Upon hearing of the rubble that 
was once Lisbon, the King, at wits’ end (so the story goes), turned to his assembled 
nobles and asked what could be done to combat this ‘Infliction of Divine Justice’?  
Amidst much hand wringing and urging of more fervent prayer came the alleged and 
legendary response of his Minister for Foreign Affairs, José de Carvalho e Mello (later to 
obtain the title of the Marquês de Pombal and by which he is referred in this paper): 
‘Bury the dead and feed the living’ [8].  The King was so awestruck at Pombal’s calm 
and rational response that he quickly directed Pombal to take charge of bringing order 
back to the city [9]. 
 With the King’s approval and powers of martial law, Pombal took immediate 
action.  Within a matter of days, a food distribution system, the interment of the dead at 
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sea (even with the cooperation of an often reluctant Catholic clergy) and the 
establishment of law and order were all undertaken according to his direction [10].  The 
army was deployed to prevent people from fleeing the country, looters were summarily 
hanged, and pleas for special treatment from the nobles and clergy were ignored [11].  
Pombal quickly became a heroic figure among the Portuguese people, a phenomenon that 
has made it exceedingly difficult to ascertain what he actually accomplished during the 
immediate aftermath of the earthquake.  However, there is no doubt that his efforts 
effectively started Lisbon on the road to recovery. 
 Pombal gained his power through a combination of opportunity, ambition and 
skill.  At the time of the earthquake, he was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and 
War, a position he had held since 1750 [12].  This position, along with the Prime Minister 
and the Secretary of the Navy, was at the pinnacle of power in the Portuguese national 
government.  However, Prime Minister Pedro da Mota, sick and ageing, scarcely had the 
ability to oversee the government in stable times, let alone after a catastrophic 
earthquake.  Diogo da Mota, Secretary of the Navy, was both a weak administrator and 
courtier who fled in panic once the earthquake struck.  Thus, of the triumvirate, only 
Pombal was able to keep his wits and react sensibly [13]. 
 There was also a great degree of understanding between the King and Pombal.  In 
the beginning of his reign, King José 1 was dutifully attentive to the monarchial 
obligations.  Over time, noting that Pombal was able to govern effectively without him, 
the King turned to the more pleasant activities of royal life such as hunting, riding or 
going to the opera.  After the earthquake, the King tuned increasingly to religious 
activities.  Thus, with the King’s confidence and lack of interest in day-to-day affairs of 
state, Pombal, with great skill, was able effectively to control governmental operations 
[14]. 
 The only countervailing efforts to control Pombal’s powers came from the nobles 
who generally regarded him as an upstart, and the Jesuits who perceived him as a threat 
to their position of influence [15].  Both groups made various attempts to diminish 
Pombal’s power and both failed.  In a series of deft and often brutal moves, Pombal was 
ultimately able to eliminate them as competing powers and gain virtually absolute control 





 Pombal began to prepare for the reconstruction of the city within a matter of 
weeks following the earthquake [16].  He organized a triumvirate of ministers to report to 
him on all aspects of life in the city [17].  Subordinate to this group, he appointed 12 
magistrates with strong powers to govern the dozen districts in the city [18].  Once this 
organization was in place, Pombal was able to assign others to handle short-term 
emergencies and began to focus on rebuilding the city [19]. 
 A four-part strategy set the stage for the re-planning of the city.  First, due to the 
extensive damage to property and lost records, he directed that an inventory of the exact 
description and measurement of all houses, offices, shops, public spaces, roads and 
barrios be undertaken.  This task was particularly difficult, in the light of the fact that the 
streets were often little more than cow paths and there were frequently competing claims 
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for the same property.  Without this information, however, no fair means of adjudicating 
property disputes could occur [20]. 
 Secondly, needing to find shelter, people began to build huts, shacks and shanties 
outside the city walls with little concern for property lines or civic order.  Pombal was 
concerned with the ramifications of these actions on the long-term development of the 
city.  Since no plans for the area had yet been created, he strictly prohibited all 
construction outside the old city walls [21].  Within the Baixa, a similar phenomenon was 
occurring: there was a rush on the part of the owners to reconstruct as rapidly as possible 
with little regard for site planning, hygiene and density limitations.  Pombal and his staff 
realized that unless this rush was controlled, the city would be even more chaotic than 
before the earthquake.  In response, he issued a decree on 30 December 1755, prohibiting 
building within the city while the aforementioned inventory was being undertaken [22].  
This decree lasted until 12 February 1756, until he was forced, by public pressure, to lift 
the prohibition [23].  Pombal refused to be stopped, however, and insisted on 16 
September 1756 that all structures must be built to officially approved standards and still 
later, on 8 October 1760, he ordered the demolition of all buildings that did not meet 
planning specifications.  (Few people ever won an argument with the person whom 
various authors have compared to Richelieu, Colbert, Haussmann and Cromwell [24]. 
 Thirdly, there was the question of how best to finance the rebuilding of the city.  
Several European nations provided a source of funds that helped to start the recovery.  An 
enormous contribution of gold and diamonds from Brazil was also obtained and the 
nation’s gold supply was not harmed by the tremor.  To complete the financing, Pombal 
exacted a 4% tax on manufacturing and merchandising [25]. 
 Thus, in these early stages Pombal began to procure information, to protect 
undeveloped areas, to ensure orderly, planned development in the Baixa, and to obtain 
funding to finance the reconstruction effort.  The seeds for the reconstruction were 
quickly planted and began to bear fruit rapidly. 
 
The architects: wisdom, utility and style 
 In order to understand the roots of the design and planning efforts that governed 
the reconstruction of the Baixa, it is necessary to understand the contributions of the King 
João V era (1706-50) to the tastes and styles of the nation.  During his reign the nation 
had experienced a dramatic increase in affluence and prosperity [26].  With gold and 
diamonds flowing into Portugal from Brazil, the King embarked on a building splurge 
across the country.  Many of these structures were built in the rich and ornate Baroque 
traditions as seen in the works of Bernini, Borromini and Juvara [27].  Of all projects 
undertaken, two of the most impressive in Greater Lisbon were the Palacio Nacionàl at 
Mafra (1717-30, 1752, 1794) and the aqueduct of Águas Livres (Free Waters) built 
between 1729 and 1748.  The story of Mafra and its influence on Portuguese design is 
beyond this paper.  The following figures, however, illustrate its importance: over the 
span of 13 years, between 20,000 and 50,000 workers, under the control of 6,000 
soldiers, toiled on a project that included a basilica, palace, monastery, convent, hospital, 
library, chapels and monks’ cells [28].  Designed by Frederico Ludovice (1670-1752) in 
an enormous grid-iron pattern, it was and still remains one of the largest construction 
projects in the history of the nation.  Its significance, apart from its massive size, is 
twofold.  First, it established the Baroque as the prevailing style in the country for the 
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first half of the century.  Secondly, it served as a training ground for the nation’s 
architects, engineers, sculptors and other craftsmen for decades.  Many of these artists 
and craftsmen eventually assumed positions of authority and responsibility in the 
reconstruction efforts that followed the earthquake. 
 The second and more practical project was the construction of the famed aqueduct 
of Águas Livres [29].  Designed by Custódio Vieira and engineered by Manuel da Maia 
between 1729 and 1748, the aqueduct extends over 61,000 linear feet and is carried by 
109 arches of ‘Pedra Liz’.  Characterized by Gothic vaulting and clean, strong lines, this 
structure was one of Europe’s 18th century engineering marvels [30].  Like Mafra, it 
served as a training ground for the craftsmen who later assisted in the rebuilding of 
Lisbon.  In its simplicity, it provided a startling counterpoint to the frivolous, expensive 
and ornate structures at Mafra. 
 Both of these projects are representative of cultural pressures at work in Lisbon at 
mid-century.  Mafra represents the Crown, religion, absolutism, excess, the Baroque and 
the ornate.  The Águas Livres represents the state, the secular, the people, utility and 
relative simplicity.  These pressures continued to be felt in the aftermath of the 
earthquake.  After all, the architects who were responsible for the implementation of 
these projects were later responsible for Lisbon’s future. 
 Pombal assembled a team of designers to guide the rebuilding of the city who 
were representative of a cross-section of eighteenth century Portuguese design history.  
The person who was responsible for the conceptual development of the plan, and the 
eldest of the group at 83 years of age, was General Manuel da Maia (1672-1768).  Royal 
Engineer-in-chief, Maia had had a wealth of experiences that made him a logical 
designee.  Trained in the Vaubanesque style of military fortification, architecture and 
engineering of the late seventeenth century/early eighteenth century, director of the 
Academy of Fortification (Aula de Fortificação), extensively experienced in developing 
projects through the reigns of three kings, and author of a previously unimplemented plan 
of Lisbon, he was well-grounded in the problems that were facing the city [31].  He was 
extremely respectful of the Spanish Mannerist style with its serious and moralistic 
overtones – a point which would become significant in the Proto-Classical revival in 
Lisbon [32].  In effect, Maia represented a link to the past, to tradition and to a period 
when the monarch was absolute. 
 Below Maia in rank were Captain Eugénio dos Santos (1711-60) and Lieutenant 
Colonel Carlos Mardel (1695-1763).  These two military engineers were responsible for 
overseeing the creation of the plan and its implementation.  Beyond the fact that both 
held a military commission, they were quite different people.  Santos, aged 45 at the time 
of the earthquake, was a former student of Maia’s, architect to the Senate, and director of 
the Aula Civil do Paço da Ribeira, the civilian equivalent of the Aula de Fortificação 
[33].  Pragmatic and fully committed to the need for efficiency and speed, Santos must be 
most credited with understanding Pombal’s visions of a new society in a physical sense.  
It is through Santos’ work, with its emphasis on utility, simplicity and repetition that we 
can see the most extensive and sophisticated adaptation of ‘plain architecture’ undertaken 
in any Portuguese city [34]. 
 If Santos represented utility, then Carlos Mardel signified style.  Mardel, aged 60 
and Hungarian born, was sophisticated, worldly and comfortable at court.  In many ways 
his work was an effort to move the revitalization programme from emphasizing the 
 6 
simply recreation of the barracks, the military parade ground and pure utility.  Among the 
three architects, it was Mardel who displayed a willingness to experiment with new 
design approaches; a grounding in European styles and a sensitivity to the Baroque 
characteristics of Lisbon in the first half of the eighteenth century also provided an 
understanding of the need for radical simplicity in the revitalization effort [35]. 
 Thus, directing the staff responsible for guiding the future of the city were three 
military men, all architectural engineers, and all well versed in the need to balance the 
idiosyncrasies of Crown and court with the needs of the people.  Each born a generation 
apart and comfortable with concepts of design that were at times quite disparate, it is 
these three men that ultimately guided the rebirth of Lisbon, a city where old and new 
values were in conflict and where the Crown and court, while still powerful, had to face a 
rising merchant class and bourgeoisie.  In effect, they were required to move Lisbon from 
being the last of the medieval cities to the most modern of the Renaissance cities.  No 
easy task! 
 Over time, new men emerged to guide the effort, many of whom were trained by 
Maia or Santos.  This ‘second tier’ of architects and engineers included: José Monteiro de 
Carvalho who was responsible for demolition and nicknamed the ‘destroyer’ (Bota 
Abaixo); João Pedro Ludovice, son of the Mafra architect; and Reinaldo Manuel who 
replaced Santos in 1763.  Thus, throughout Pombal’s post-earthquake years as Prime 
Minister (1755-77), a sense of continuity was maintained [36]. 
 
The framework 
 On 4 December 1755, the Duke de Lafões was informed that Maia had begun the 
replanning of the city.  Over a period of six months, Maia submitted three concept papers 
(dissertations) to Pombal outlining site planning, construction and design options [37]. 
 Four site planning options were offered concerning the rebuilding of the city, each 
designed by a different team of architectural engineers [38].  The first was the ‘no 
change’ option which emphasized rebuilding the city as closely as possible along existing 
street lines and at the same density.  The second centered on a widening of the streets but 
with little change in densities.  The third and most radical, called for the total demolition 
(‘clean slate’) of the core of the Baixa and reconstruction along a new road pattern, at a 
lower density and with new construction standards.  The final option called for a new 
capital to be built near Belém.  Acceptance of this idea would have led to the 
abandonment of the old city [39]. 
 Maia provided an analysis of the positive and negative features of each option.  
The ‘no change’ option was the least disrupting.  Property would not have to be 
reparcelled, roads reconfigured or densities changed.  On the other hand, the structures 
would remain earthquake prone and the opportunities for sanitary improvements would 
be lost.  The ‘road widening’ option had merit in that it would ease transportation 
movement and provide more sunlight and airflow.  However, it would still require the 
confiscation of some land while structures would continue to be placed in high density 
configuration.  Further, the structures would still be sensitive to damage by another 
earthquake [40]. 
 The ‘clean slate’ option provided an opportunity to create a modern city – one in 
which the infrastructure, the design of the buildings, the construction techniques, and the 
site planning would meet the needs of the modern capital city of an empire.  However, 
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this option also had several negative features, including the demolition of sound existing 
buildings.  (Among these were, ironically, Pombal’s home, the one Protestant Church and 
the brothels [41].  This demolition would have occurred at a time when housing was 
critical and the citizens were pressing to build new dwellings.  Conditions, then, would 
become worse before they improved.  This option, with its proposed lower density, meant 
that the city would have to spread out beyond its walls.  Pombal considered this 
undesirable. 
 The ‘new site’ option would have caused great hardship.  In effect it would have 
ignored the human suffering of the dislocated, would have created a legal nightmare 
concerning property rights and would send a psychological message to the people still 
living in the city that they were being abandoned.  In short, it would be an arrogant, 
‘Royal’ solution – one in which imperial form would take precedence over the needs of 
common people.  At the same time, however, there were some assets to the approach.  
The new city would be totally modern; not encumbered by existing property lines, 
structures or roads; it could be built quickly and it could be built using the latest 
construction techniques. 
 What motivated Maia in the development of his concepts?  It is known that he 
was quite concerned about the possibility of recurring earthquakes [42].  Since he had 
been an active worker in the earthquake’s immediate aftermath, he could not have missed 
noticing the propensity for the 4- and 5-story buildings collapsing into the street (where 
people had gathered for safety – to no avail) [43].  Such concerns clearly motivated his 
desire for lower building heights, the elimination of arches and arcade, and the use of 
masonry and framed construction techniques. 
 Maia had also realized that there was a need to move people and carriages quickly 
and freely through the streets.  With the rabbit’s warren of paths and streets, movement 
was time consuming and difficult.  This problem was noted by Maia as early as 1741 
when he requested King João V to replot the streets surrounding the Church of Santa 
Isabel.  In this instance he requested wider streets, built to a standard, to allow the 
walking public and carriages to move freely and safely [44]. 
 Maia was inspired in his ideas by the revitalization of London after the Great Fire 
of 1666 and the plan for Turin developed for King Sarno by Ivvaro [45].  What 
specifically he gained is unknown.  It is known that Wren’s plan for London, despite 
having been created in the previous century, addressed many of the problems facing 
Lisbon.  It is also known that Pombal was familiar with London, having served as 
Portugal’s ambassador to England [46].  Concerning Turin, the concepts applied to that 
new city would have had direct application if the capital was relocated to Belém.  The 
Turin plan called for building a new capital immediately adjacent to the old.  However, 
neither example offered help in terms of addressing the personal hardships of the people. 
 Maia, in retrospect, seemed ambivalent in his feelings toward the future of the 
city.  He was appreciative of tradition, of the need to promote the image of the nation and 
the crown as well as the need to maintain the unique Lisbonesque quality of life.  On the 
other hand, he was a practical engineer who saw the need to modernize and utilize the 
most advanced technological innovations.  All of his options involved sacrifice.  Maia 
presented his ideas to Pombal who, after careful review, selected the ‘clean slate’ option.  
Maia thus had his orders [47]. 
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The six plans 
 Maia assembled six military architect/engineers to develop alternative plans for 
the Baixa.  Arranged as two person teams, he directed each to focus on a specific concept 
and, as well, to mutually share their design ideas.  After the first three approaches were 
created, he shuffled the teams and asked for three refined plans from which one would be 
accepted. 
 The goal of the first plan, as developed by Gualter da Foneca and aided by 
Pinheiro da Cunha, was to develop a scheme that related as much as possible to the 
layout of the city before the earthquake.  The dimensions of the old structures would 
remain the same but the roads and the squares were to be realigned.  The plan needed to 
address the fact that the Baixa had been laced with more than 40 streets and 70 lanes.  
Ever the engineer, Fonseca proposed the virtual elimination of the curved street from the 
area and even called for the straightened realignment of streets in the hills to the east and 
west where there was minimal damage from the tremor. 
 The plan had certain positive attributes.  It was minimally disruptive and quickly 
implementable.  Former residents would have a clear understanding of where their 
properties were and how they could build.  Further, the cost to the crown in terms of civic 
improvements would have been minimal, simply rebuilding the institutional structures in 
the same areas as they were before the earthquake. 
 But would this plan help Lisbon to become a future-looking city and take its place 
among the capital cities of the Enlightenment?  The plan did not reflect the need for 
modern sanitation, the overcrowded living conditions and the grandeur required for the 
capital city of a world empire.  In fact one of its most damning features was its 
‘pedestrian’ nature and the absence of grand avenues, royal squares and monumental 
structures. 
 It would appear that Maia had little serious intention of ever accepting this 
approach.  With its minimal changes and failure to address the needs of a changing city, it 
was far more an exercise in explaining why ‘Antiga Lisboa’ could not be resuscitated 
than in proposing a reasonable alternative for reconstruction.  By revealing the absurdity 
of looking backward, he hoped to eliminate doubt concerning the validity of the more 
modernistic proposals. 
 The second plan, directed by Captain Elias Sebastião Poppe, and aided by his 
brother José Domingues Poppe, was not bound by any factors designed to retain the 
character of the old city.  Maia directed him to develop a plan with a completely new 
street system which included wide avenues.  Poppe chose to create a scheme marked by 
rigid rectangles of various sizes.  Three wide avenues interlaced the Baixa along with 
seven cross streets.  Only one of the avenues connected the city’s two major squares, the 
Terreiro do Paço and the Rossio.  Poppe chose not to impose the new street pattern on the 
little damaged Alfama district to the east. 
 The Poppe Plan represented a significant departure from Fonseca’s Plan.  It was at 
once utilitarian with its repetitious row on row of blocks and an abstract step toward the 
enlightened city with its emphasis on ease of movement, sunlight and airflow.  Above all, 
it was a dramatic announcement that it was possible to create a new community based 
upon the standards of the time within the heart of an old city. 
 The goal of the third plan was to synthesize the ideas formulated by Fonseca and 
Poppe.  Developed by dos Santos and aided by A.C. Andreas, the plan included three 
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major avenues that connected the Rossio to the north and the Terreiro do Paço to the 
south.  There were five cross streets of different widths.  Equidistant between the two 
squares was an open plaza that provided the opportunity for monuments and a means to 
visually connect to the edges of the Baixa. 
 Dos Santos’ plan is the only one that attempts to forge strong connections with the 
Terreiro do Paço to the Baixa and where the square obtains a sense of articulation.  
Above all, the plan maximized access to the sea and provided a clear sense of entrance to 
the centre of the city.  His plan began, in a rudimentary manner, to focus on the crucial 
elements of structure, topography, function and nature. 
 If one looks at the three plans as a progression from simple solutions to an 
increased sense of sophistication then one can easily understand why the dos Santos plan 
was of the greatest interest to Maia.  In fact, the scheme for the Terreiro do Paço 
developed by dos Santos caused a shift in Maia’s concepts.  From the very beginning he 
expected that the Terreiro do Paço would remain important as a civic space but that the 
Rossio would become the new ‘Royal Square’: its location was in an area of likely 
growth and several royal buildings were being proposed along its edges [48].  However, 
dos Santos’ ideas for the Terreiro do Paço so captured the imagination of Maia that from 
then on he directed all his architects to treat it as the Royal Square and to focus on the 
Rossio as a space for mercantile activity. 
 There were some problems, however.  The purpose of the new central square was 
never fully explained and the rationale for the differing widths of the streets was unclear.  
Above all, it raised significant discussion at the highest levels of government because it 
called for the partial taking of properties belonging to the Church and the nobility, two 
groups with whom Pombal was already in conflict.  This alone was almost reason enough 
to cause its rejection as an alternative! 
 From these three plans Maia was able to grasp increasingly detailed concepts for 
the city plan.  However, none of the three submitted proposals was acceptable.  Thus, 
with the intent of further stimulating creativity he reconstituted the teams.  They were 
once again prepared under the direction of Fonseca, Poppe and dos Santos. 
 The Fourth Plan, as developed by Fonseca, was unrealistic and bordered on 
fantasy.  In plan view, it takes on the image of a pyramidically formed wedding cake with 
an empty ill-defined Rossio at the top; a series of streets and blocks laid out with parade 
ground rigidity in between and, a base consisting of massive blocks of building in the 
Terreiro do Paço. 
 Despite its rigidity, the plan met many of Maia’s concerns.  Ease of movement, 
access to sunlight for long periods, opportunities for air flow and logical reparcelization 
were all accommodated.  Yet it was insensitive to the terrain, the waterfront and the need 
for open space.  The plan had so many castrum-like qualities that in a final analysis it 
would have been more fitting in a fortress than as the heart of a world-class city. 
 The sixth plan prepared by Poppe was imaginative, with some small blocks, some 
sense of monumentality, some elements of a radical plan and, interestingly, a recognition 
that the curved street could still be utilized as a design feature.  What is most striking is 
the placement of two churches; a newly-sited structure (as opposed to one rebuilt on a 
pre-earthquake site) at a halfway point between the two squares and a massive patriarchal 
cathedral proposed for the Terreiro do Paço.  Its greatest weakness was the redesign of 
the Terreiro do Paço: Poppe chose to enclose the square such that it became 
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predominantly inward looking.  It would have been tethered to the Baixa by connections 
to three avenues but with little sense of drama.  Perhaps of more importance, structures 
were proposed almost to the edge of the Tagus, creating a feeling that Lisbon was turning 
its back to the sea. 
 The fifth plan prepared by dos Santos, with assistance and later corrections by 
Carlos Mardel, was simple yet dynamic.  Dos Santos proposed realigning the squares and 
streets by 13º such that maximum opportunities for afternoon sunlight could occur.  At 
the same time, he proposed that the shape of the Terreiro do Paço be changed so that it 
would intrude more deeply into the Baixa itself.  While this eliminated the possibility of 
placing up to three blocks of buildings in the business area, it provided the strong linkage 
between the Baixa and the Terreiro do Paço that was required and created ample space 
for monumentality while maintaining an openness to the river.  At once ceremony, 
iconography, commerce, bureaucratic functions and everyday human interaction were 
served.   
 The design of the streets was different from the other proposals and contributed to 
a sense of dynamic unity.  The plan called for five major north – south streets, two of 
which connected the squares.  Between these two ‘Ruas Nobres’, were three narrow 
streets that ended several blocks before the Terreiro do Paço.  Concerning the layout of 
buildings, Santos divided the blocks into two rectangular forms, the top five blocks 
having elongated north – south sides and the lower two blocks having elongated east – 
west sides. 
 A radically different urban dynamic was at work that included unique block 
patterns, variation in road widths, lengths and end points, in addition to a redesigned 
Terreiro do Paço.  The reorientation of the Baixa allowed for additional sunlight while 
new space for monuments was also created.  With ease of movement, standardized lots, 
easy parcelization, only minimal church relocation and opportunities for monumentality, 
Santos’ plan met all of the basic conceptual objectives set by Maia and became the basis 
for the ‘Baixa Pombalina’. 
 
Towards an iconographic understanding 
 
Introduction 
 Within the context of the reconstruction plan for Lisbon, Pombal created a theatre 
in which the city was the ‘stage’ – one employing subtlety, drama, tragedy, and tragic-
comedy.  The plan, manipulated by a director not far from centre stage, resulted in a 
radically-different power structure in Portugal.  It is through the use of symbol and icons 
that this can best be illustrated.  The most important ones are noted below. 
 
Nature 
 If anything, the planning ethos that governed the plan for Lisbon, as an 
abstraction, focused upon the conquering of nature.  Though the earthquake had, in 
effect, revealed its power over reason; Christianity had taught man to conquer nature.  It 
was the duty of the State, as the people’s secular interpreter of reason and protector of the 
nation’s welfare, to show that it was making an effort to reinstate Man’s power over the 
elements. 
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 This is reflected, for example, in the grid-iron layout of streets.  This design was 
not common to any of the Portuguese cities during the eighteenth century, did not fit into 
the natural contour of the Lisbon landscape, and did not, in any way, lend itself to 
resolving questions of property realignment.  In essence, the grid-iron pattern was a 
foreign concept that was brought to Lisbon as an expression of the will of the state.  
There was nothing natural about it.  To impose such a design on a city that was so 
organically patterned before the earthquake was to announce that a new order was at 
work. 
 The grid-iron design was far more reflective of the thoughts of Vauban, the ideals 
of the Law of the Indies, and the Roman Castrum than the creation of the British market 
towns, or the sense of ‘Heimat’ found in Berman cities along the Romantic Road.  The 
Vaubanesque concepts emphasized that if nature was in the way of design, then nature 
would have to be changed.  In Lisbon, we see this in the rejection of the natural landscape 
as the basis for site layout.  More specifically, the hills of Lisbon to the east, north and 
west and the gentle rise of the Baixa called for a design that reflected the gentle curve, the 
subtle vista and a changing skyline that enabled sunlight and shadow to work their magic.  
Such design treatments were for another time and were not taken into consideration. 
 It was at the water’s edge, where the River Tagus meets the city, that the striking 
juxtaposition of Man and Nature was most pronounced.  As a ship’s passenger moved 
along the Tagus toward port, one was aware of the movement of the ship and its 
relationship to Nature.  The push or pull of the tide, the roll of the ship on the water, and 
the presence or absence of the wind were constant reminders that Nature determined 
when and to what degree of comfort he would arrive.  As our passenger looked from the 
river toward Lisbon, he saw the urban landscape but would have been more conscious of 
the hills surrounding the city – that the city was situated in a natural cocoon.  Indeed, as a 
whole, the hills would have dominated this comprehensive vista far more than the man-
made structural elements of the city.  It is however at the point of disembarkation that the 
sense of man conquering nature occurs: upon leaving the ship, the traveler is welcome by 
stone steps that lead up to the Praça do Comércio.  It is here that he would receive a 
psychological message that he had now entered a world controlled by man.  The tides, the 
moon, the water, the sun, and the wind were now seconded to the powers of rational 
humankind.  The traveler was greeted by Machado’s statue of the King (at greater than 
human scale) to the immediate centre, the houses of commerce and banking serving as 
anchors firmly implanted along the river’s edge and the houses of law and bureaucracy 
beyond. 
 If this traveler, after walking up the steps, looked around with his back to the 
river, could he see anything natural?  There were no running fountains, no green grass, no 




 Perhaps the greatest change in terms of the rebuilding of the new Lisbon relates to 
the presence of the Church as a symbol. 
 It was no longer the age of cathedrals.  At the same time, however, the physical 
design of the churches was important as a symbolic means of reflecting the greater glory 
of God.  It was important that the church reflect permanence and sanctity and above all, 
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inspire awe in the congregation.  It was the ‘church mystical’ with which the planners had 
to deal.  One approach would have been to rebuild the churches exactly as they were 
before the earthquake, with their highly visible edifices dominating the secular structures 
of everyday life.  Yet the high steeples and bell towers, the massive doors and the setting 
of these old churches constantly reinforced the notion that the Church was at least equal 
in power to the State.  Here there is the classic conflict between Church and State: which 
institution would capture the hearts and minds of the people?  Once divided, in what way 
can physical structures reinforce the primacy of one over the other?  Pombal clearly 
wished to control the Church.  His expulsion of the Jesuits and strict controls on the 
Inquisition are examples of these efforts. 
 In a physical sense his planners were also controlling the Church as symbol.  No 
longer would there need to be a majestical Patriarchal Palace, no longer would there be a 
skyline dominated by church towers, and no longer would the churches be the focal point 
of each parish.  There is no formal documentation from Pombal directing the planners to 
redevelop the churches in this manner.  It is known, however, that the collapse of the 
church towers contributed to Maia’s refusal to allow their reconstruction.  It is also 
known that the symmetry of the site plan for the Baixa, in order to work, had to treat the 
churches in the same manner as all other structures.  Regardless of the motivation, the 
fact remains that in a site plan, architectural and iconographic sense, the visibility of the 
Church was greatly diminished. 
 
The statue 
 In the history of the evolution of Lisbon more is written about this statue than any 
other single architectural object.  Pombal directed that a statue to King José I be designed 
and erected in the Terreiro do Paço.  Its symbolism can be noted on several levels. 
 On the first level, Pombal required that the statue be designed and crafted by 
Portuguese artists.  Prior to the design, it was customary to employ Italian and French 
sculptors for major works.  Pombal was making an assertion that Portuguese designers 
were as talented as those found in the traditionally more cultured cities and nations. 
 The siting of the statue created a great degree of controversy regarding the 
direction the King should face.  Should the statue be positioned inland towards his people 
or to the sea, the Portuguese empire, and traders entering his domain?  The controversy 
was heightened due both to humorous and serious discussion about the backside of the 
King’s horse.  Was a subtle message being sent to the people of Lisbon with their view 
focusing on the animal’s back side? 
 At a second level there were some issues concerning the formal name for the 
square.  Pombal changed the name from the Terreiro do Paço to the Praça do Comércio 
(Plaza of Commerce).  This was significant in several ways.  For one, merchants were 
bearing an immense responsibility in terms of the cost of recovery and, for this alone, 
deserving to be celebrated.  Further, over time, the Praça do Comércio had emerged as a 
centre of high mercantile trade.  Therefore, there was little consternation over the re-
naming of the square except for one subtle but important point: should it have the word 
‘real’ (royal) in its title?  For example, should it be the Real Praça do Comércio or the 
Praça Real do Comércio?  Pombal, on several occasions, referred to the square in writing 
with the additional word ‘real’ in his text.  Given Pombal’s sense of directness, it would 
be hard to accept his words as being a slip of the pen.  It appears that he was attempting 
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to place a royal stamp of approval upon the mercantilist efforts emerging in Lisbon 
during his rule.  After all, even the rights of trade were dependent upon the approval of 
the King and his ministers. 
 Despite Pombal’s efforts, direct, subtle or accidental, the fact is that the ‘real’ 
prefix did not catch on.  The fact remained that this square, despite the Kiung’s 
monument and the presence of the imposing governmental structures, was simply not a 
royal place.  This square was (and is) far more utilitarian than symbolic, more bourgeois 
than courtly, more mercantile than royal, and more bureaucratic than concerned with 
statescraft.  While there is dignity, and a celebration of the crown, this square was (and 
is) the people’s place.  The formal name remained the Praça do Comércio. 
 Finally, we have the hubris of Pombal himself.  Directly below the King, on the 
base of the statue, Pombal directed the placement of a medallion commemorating 
himself.  While one cannot argue over the significant energy and actions taken by Pombal 
to save the state, one can state that the selection of subjects for commemoration are better 
left to others than oneself!  (Interestingly, after Pombal was removed from power by 
Queen Maria, the medallion was removed.  Years later, it was returned to its original 
position where it remains today). 
 There is little argument that the sculpture is a striking piece.  It is dark when all 
around it is light and is bigger than life yet does not dominate. 
 
Roads 
 The difference between old and new streets has already been noted.  However, the 
rationale for naming the streets also warrants discussion.  Pombal was extremely desirous 
of creating a strong sense of mercantilism in the city.  In order to reinforce this feeling, 
the streets were named in such a manner as to encourage merchants to locate on the 
streets so designated.  The long streets connecting the Praça do Comércio to the Rossio 
were named for the key marker functions to be undertaken.  Cross streets represented the 
church and the side streets were named for members of the Royal family.  The question 
that one must ask is why? 
 The fact that the long merchant streets connected two market squares subtly but 
directly made the point that this area of the city was designated for merchant activity.  It 
was not proclamation, law or regulation but simply a designation of use by area.  A 
unique concept for the time. 
 
Lisbon as an abstraction 
 It is clear that the key importance of the Lisbon Plan, in an historical and a 
theoretical planning context, lies in the fact that it was developed as the physical symbol 
of the major change which the Portuguese nation was about to experience.  This is 
illustrated by the attention given to the plans that followed the earthquake. 
 To begin with, there is the role of the nation-state in the reconstruction of the city.  
While one can point to rulers and royalty ranging from Jefferson to Prince Charles that 
have had an active general interest in city planning, it is rare when one becomes directly 
involved in the details and intricacies of plans and their implementation.  Pombal’s intent 
was to send messages to the King, nobles, church officials, the people, the colonists and 
the European nations that the Portuguese national government was in charge and acting 
on the needs of the state through its city building efforts.  We must remember that 
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Lisbon, as a city, was many things: a residence of the king and nobility, the capital city of 
a nation and empire, a centre of trade, the seat of the Patriarch, and the home of 
approximately 275,000 people.  The plan had to react in one way or another to the needs 
of all groups. 
 The plan rejects the concept that Lisbon is a royal city.  Royal structures are 
clearly less significant and fewer in number than before the earthquake.  Pombal, 
however, realized that his power rested with the Crown.  Totally removing the royal 
presence, symbolic or otherwise, would have potentially resulted in a questioning of his 
loyalty.  Pombal resolved this dilemma through the construction and placement of the 
King’s statue in the Praça do Comércio.  It is significant that there are no fawning, 
sycophantic nobility at his feet nor a phalanx of soldiers surrounding him.  Instead we see 
the greater than human scale King astride his (then) black horse with common folks 
trading at his feet, surrounded by buildings in which mundane bureaucratic work was 
being undertaken.  The message was that the King may rule but life goes on.  Pombal’s 
royal square was, in reality, the people’s square. 
 Pombal was not nearly as accommodating to the nobility as he was toward the 
citizenry.  The confidence that the King had in Pombal provides a clear depiction of a 
man who did not have to respond to the whims and whines of this group.  His attitude 
toward the nobility is also reflected in the designs for the Baixa: the utilitarian, simple, 
economical structures hardly indicate that men and women of stature resided therein.  
Given the desire of the nobility for pomp and architectural grandiosity, the new Lisbon 
was not to their liking.  Relatively few of the nobles built new estates in the city during 
Pombal’s rule.  As with the Praça do Comércio, the Baixa ultimately became the home of 
the tradesmen and mercantilist: these groups in essence were the new Lisbonian upper-
class. 
 The most interesting part of the Lisbon planning effort, however, centres upon the 
role of the military.  The plan was strongly regimental in form, was developed by military 
men, and the important architects all held military rank.  But, where was the military?  
Lisbon was not a garrison city.  It did not have the thousands of troops that were found in 
Berlin, was not designated in Vaubanesque fashion to serve as a Fostresstadt, and was not 
developed so that troops and cannon could easily move through the streets.  To answer 
the question directly, the military presence was minimal, largely held to the Arsenal 
located at the edge of the Tagus. 
 A fundamental question emerges here: when is a military plan not militaristic?  
The answer may be the Lisbon plan.  If one accepts standardization, utility, 
regimentation, order, simplicity, and efficiency as military traits alone, then this is a 
military plan.  If one accepts them as pragmatic and practical solutions for a city desiring 
rationally to recover then it is not.  I believe it is the later case. 
 In sum, Lisbon, as an abstraction, represented a vehicle for change.  Pombal 
employed the opportunity to show that a new era had arrived.  This new era no longer 
represented the power of the crown, nobility, and church.  It now celebrated the 
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